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Will Junior's First Words Be
"I'H See You In Court!"?
Harman v. Hartman'
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of parental immunity, in its original form, prevented
children from suing their parents in tort.' Although the immunity once
enjoyed almost universal acceptance, it has been the target of modem
criticism The vast majority of states which once embraced the immunity
have either limited or wholly abrogated its application.4
In Missouri, parental immunity only prevented minors from asserting
causes of action based in negligence against their parents.' Over time,
Missouri courts limited the application of parental immunity to actions by
unemancipated minors which could jeopardize family relations.6 In Hartman
v. Hartman, the Missouri Supreme Court wholly abolished parental immunity
and adopted a "reasonable parent" standard of care.7
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In Hartman v. Hartman,8 the Missouri Supreme Court consolidated two
cases (Hartman and Armstrong) for a re-examination of the application of the
parental immunity doctrine in Missouri.'
In the Hartman case, two unemancipated minor children filed a
negligence action for personal injuries against their father and grandfather.'0
The children alleged that the defendants negligently maintained and operated
a gas stove that exploded and injured the children.' The father filed a
1. 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991) (en bane).
2. Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of a Justification, 50
FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 489 (1982).
3. See id. at 525-27; Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity:
Spare the Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1161, 1161-65 (1991); Carolyn L.
Andrews, Note, Parent-Child Torts in Texas and the Reasonable Prudent Parent Standard, 40
BAYLOR L. Rv. 113 (1988). /
4. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1161 n.3; see also Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation,
Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern
Cases, 6 A.L.R. 4TH 1066 §§ 6-18 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
5. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 855.
6. Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Mo. 1979) (en bane) (quoting Brennecke v.
Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo. 1960) (en bane)).
7. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 858.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 852.
10. Id. at 852-53.
11. Id. at 853.
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motion for summary judgment, alleging that the parental immunity doctrine
prevented unemancipated, minor children from asserting a negligence claim
against a custodial parent. 2 The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss
and the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed. 3
In the Armstrong case, Tracy Armstrong, an unemancipated minor,
brought an action for negligence against her mother Mary Armstrong. 4
Michael Armstrong, Sr. also brought a claim against Mary Armstrong for the
wrongful death of their son Michael Armstrong, Jr., an unemancipated
minor. Tracy was severely injured, and Michael Jr. was killed after being
struck by a van while pushing Mary Armstrong's stalled vehicle on the 1-435
Bridge in Kansas City. 6 The plaintiffs alleged that Mary Armstrong's
negligence, combined with the negligence of the van operator, caused Tracy's
injuries and Michael Jr.'s death.'
The defendant, Mary Armstrong, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action.'8 She asserted that the parental immunity doctrine
barred her daughter's negligence claim and the claim for the wrongful death
of her son. 9 The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs appealed
to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District." The Missouri Supreme
Court granted transfer prior to the issuance of an opinion by the court of
appeals.2'
After evaluating the theory and application of parental immunity by
Missouri courts, the Missouri Supreme Court found an insufficient basis to
retain the immunity.' The court held that parental immunity would no
longer bar any action by a child against his or her parent.' The court then












22. Id. at 853-58.
23. Id. at 858.
24. Id. at 858-59.
[Vol. 58
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ABROGATION OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Doctrine
1. Nationally
Parental immunity is ajudicially created doctrine first applied in the case
of Hewellette v. George. Hewellette barred a child's claim for false
imprisonment against her parents on the rationale that parental immunity must
exist in order to preserve family harmony.26 Two other courts soon applied
the newly formed immunity and, together with Hewellette, are considered the
"great trilogy" foundation of the doctrine." Parental immunity was soon
adopted in all but five states.28
Throughout the years, various rationales have been put forth in support
of parental immunity. These include maintaining adequate leeway for parents
in the exercise of parental authority,29 avoidance of fraud or collusion
between family members,3" protection of family assets and maintenance of
a proportionate share of the wealth between family members,3' avoidance of
the possibility that a tortfeasor parent may profit by inheriting the child's
recovery,32 and the analogous familial relationship which supports immunity
between spouses.33
2. Missouri
Missouri first considered the issue of parental immunity in Wells v.
Wells.34 The Missouri Court of Appeals at Kansas City recognized a
negligence cause of action between an unemancipated child and her mother
resulting from an automobile accident." The court reasoned that because
25. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
26. Id. at 887.
27. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903) (child barred from suing father or
stepmother for cruel and inhumane treatment); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905) (child
raped by father could not sue for pain and suffering).
28. These states were Hawaii, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. See Petersen v.
City & County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1970) (no parental immunity); Rupert v.
Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974) (no parental immunity); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37
(Utah 1980) (no immunity for intentional torts); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1977)
(indicated that limitations might be placed upon parent-child actions in the future). South Dakota
courts have not considered the issue.
29. McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664.
30. Coleman v. Coleman, 278 S.E.2d 114, 114 (Ga. 1981); Hastings v. Hastings, 163 A.2d
147, 150 (N.J. 1960).
31. Roller, 79 P. at 789.
32. Id.
33. Id.; McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 665.
34. 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
35. Id. at 110-11.
1993]
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Missouri did not bar property actions between children and parents, even
though a suit could cause family disharmony, tort actions should likewise not
be barred merely because of the possibility of family discord.36
A few years later in Cook v. Cook, the Missouri Court of Appeals at
Springfield followed the "prevailing common law rule" and applied parental
immunity to bar an unemancipated child's assault action against her father. 8
The court noted that the parental immunity doctrine was based upon sound
public policy that favored maintaining domestic harmony and that Missouri
had adequate criminal remedies for willful and malicious acts harmful to
children.
9
The courts in Missouri remained split upon the issue for fifteen years
until the Missouri Supreme Court resolved the conflict by applying parental
immunity in Baker v. Baker.4" Baker barred a toddler's cause of action for
negligent operation of an automobile against her father.4 The Baker
decision was grounded in the public's interest in maintaining family harmony
and the fact that no common law right allowed minors to bring a tort cause
of action against a parent.42
B. Modification and Decline of Parental Immunity
1. Nationally
The first court to significantly modify parental immunity was the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goller v. White.43 Goller retained parental
immunity only if the parent's acts could be classified as an exercise of
parental authority or the exercise of discretion in providing goods, care, or
services to the child.' Goller's approach has been followed in a substantial
number of jurisdictions.45
36. Id. at 111.
37. 124 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 677.
40. 263 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1953).
41. Id. at 31-32.
42. Id. at 30-32.
43. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (allowed a negligence suit by a son to recover for injuries
received in a farming accident).
44. Id. at 198.
45. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Ariz. 1981) (en bane) (immunity
abrogated in Arizona except where act involves an exercise of parental authority or discretion
with respect to necessities or other care provided by parents); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786,
789 (Iowa 1981) (immunity abrogated where tortious conduct is outside the area of parental
authority and discretion); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971) (parents immune
only if negligence involved the reasonable exercise of parental authority or discretion with
respect to the provision of care and necessities); Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73
(Mich. 1972) (immunity exists only if negligence involved the reasonable exercise of parental
authority or discretion with respect to the provision of care and necessities.); Ashley v. Bronson,
[Vol. 58
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By allowing child-parent suits under limited circumstances, these courts
have attempted to balance a child's right to redress with a parent's burden of
child rearing.46 The rationale for limiting parental liability is not to reward
negligent parents, but rather to enable parents to discharge the important
parental duties which society exacts from them.47 Another rationale is that
judicial scrutiny of parental acts both invades the autonomy of a family and
allows juries and judges to second-guess parental decisions with only a brief
view of the family situation.4"
The Goller standard has met with varying success and resulted in
scholarly criticism because of the difficulty in categorizing parental actions.49
There is no clear definition of which acts are within the scope of a reasonable
exercise of parental authority or an exercise of discretion in the provision of
necessities." The lack of a bright-line standard leaves courts and juries with
little guidance, which in turn results in inconsistent and vaiied outcomes."
Another criticism of this approach is that it gives parents the right to act
negligently so long as their conduct can be categorized within one of the
exceptions. 2
A few jurisdictions have adopted the "reasonable parent" standard which
was first introduced by the California Supreme Court in Gibson v. Gibson.53
The reasonable parent standard imposes the duty on parents to act as an
ordinary, reasonable, and prudent parent under similar circumstances.54
Liability is imposed if the parent fails to exercise this standard of care."
Advantages of this approach are that the reasonableness standard is familiar
473 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (parents immune from injuries caused by negligent
supervision); Small v. Rockfeld, 330 A.2d 335, 343 (N.J. 1974) (immunity abrogated where
neither the exercise of parental authority nor the adequacy of child care is an issue); Foldi v.
Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152 (N.J. 1983) (immunity abrogated for negligent supervision unless
conduct rises to level of willful or wanton failure to supervise); Felderhoffv. Felderhoff, 473
S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971) (immunity in Texas for injuries caused by ordinary negligence
involving a reasonable exercise of parental authority or discretion with respect to provision of
care and necessities).
46. Hollister, supra note 2, at 512.
47. Lemmen v. Servaise, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Wis. 1968); see also Hollister, supra note
2, at 512-15.
48. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1169-70 nn.60-65.
49. Hollister, supranote 2, at 513-14; Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1169-70 nn.60-
65.
50. Hollister, supra note 2, at 513-15.
51. Id.
52. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971); Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 857.
53. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 653 (parental immunity abrogated and reasonable parent standard
adopted); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (immunity abrogated and
reasonable parent standard adopted); Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 858 (parental immunity abrogated
and reasonable parent standard adopted).
54. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 653; Hollister, supra note 2, at 525-26.
55. Hollister, supra note 2, at 526.
1993]
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to courts and juries, and the standard has been successful in the past. 6
Moreover, this standard gives juries the flexibility to take into account factors
such as differences in cultures and heritages, but allows adequate room for a
high degree of parental deference. 7
The criticism of the reasonable parent standard of care is that given the
economic, social, and cultural varieties of our nation, there is no such thing
as "the reasonable parent."5'8 It is also argued that juries are incapable of
applying this vague standard and will substitute their views of proper
childrearing practices.59 Another criticism of the reasonable parent approach
is that it allows too many opportunities for trivial interferences with the family
and fails to grant adequate respect for family autonomy and parental
discretion.'
A recent yet substantial trend is to abolish the immunity to the extent of
the parents' liability insurance or to abolish the immunity only in automobile
accidents." There are two schools of thought about abolishing the immunity
56. Andrews, supra note 3, at 125-27.
57. Hollister, supranote 2, at 525-27; Andrews, supranote 3, at 125-27; CarlaM.Marcolin,
Note, Rousey v. Rousey: The District of Columbia Joins the National Trend Toward Abolition
of Parental Immunity, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 767, 788-89 (1988).
58. Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (Idaho 1980) ("The people of Idaho are too
diverse and independent to be judged by a common standard in such a delicate area .... "); see
Marcolin, supra note 57, at 788.
59. Marcolin, supra note 57, at 788 n.176.
60. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1180.
61. See, e.g., Ooms v. Ooms, 316 A.2d 783, 785 (Conn. 1972) (parents immune except for
injuries caused by negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d
682, 684 (Del. 1979) (parental immunity bars negligent supervision actions); Williams v.
Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 672-73 (Del. 1976) (parents are not immune for negligent operation of
a motor vehicle to the extent liability insurance exists); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066, 1067-70
(Fla. 1982) (Florida retained parental immunity except to the extent of parents' liability insurance
coverage); Cates v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330, 335 (ill. Ct. App.), appeal granted, 146 III. 2d 624
(1992) (abrogated parental immunity for child's injuries in negligent operation of motor vehicle
cases, and other actions are to be decided on a case by case basis); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick,
611 P.2d 135, 141-42 (Kan. 1980) (immunity abrogated for injuries arising out of automobile
accidents); Blackv. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979) (immunity abrogated in automobile
cases); Hahn v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 547 N.E.2d 1144, 1145 (Mass. Ct. App. 1989)
(immunity abrogated in actions arising out of automobile accidents); Triplett v. Triplett, 237
S.E.2d 546, 547 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (parents immune except in cases regarding automobile
accidents); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1369-70 (Okla. 1984) (qualified parental immunity
allows actions for negligence in automobile accidents because of compulsory automobile
insurance); Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360, 372 (Okla. 1984) (willful misconduct in
supervision of child is not protected); Wright v. Wright, 191 S.E.2d 223, 225 (Va. 1972)
(immunity upheld when injuries are due to negligence incident to the parental relationship);
Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190, 193-95 (Va. 1971) (qualified parental immunity which
allows a child to recover in automobile accidents); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610 P.2d 891, 893
(Wash. 1980) (en banc) (immunity abrogated where child's injury was sustained in automobile
accident due to parent's negligence); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418, 427-28 (W. Va.
1991) (Parental immunity is only abrogated in negligent operation ofmotorvehicle cases because
6
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in automobile accidents. The first is to allow actions against parents because
of the likelihood that the parents have mandatory automobile insurance.
-62
The rationale is that the court need not worry about disrupting family harmony
if the parents are insured because the family will not directly incur any
financial burden.6' The second is really an application of the Goller standard
by a judicial determination that negligence in the operation of an automobile
is not within the scope of protected parental authority or discretion.6
However, the approach which allows recovery to the extent of liability
61insurance has drawn much criticism. It is contrary to our notion of justice
to hinge certain plaintiffs' recovery on the extent to which the defendant
carries liability insurance.' An example of this is embodied in the Federal
Rules of Evidence in which the presence of liability insurance is barred from
trial due to the policy that fault should not be based on ability to pay.67
Children's ability to bring a cause of action against their parents should
likewise not be hinged on the parents' ability to pay.
of the substantial likelihood of insurance. The immunity is also abrogated when a parent causes
injury or death because of intentional or willful conduct if it is not a result of corporal
punishment or discipline.); see also CoNN. GEN STAT. § 52-572(c) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
539.21 (Supp. 1991).
62. See, e.g., Unah, 676 P.2d at 1369.
63. Diane C. Freniere, Private Causes of Action Against Manufacturers of Lead-based
Paint: A Response to the Lead Paint Manufacturers 'Attempt to Limit Their Liability by Seeking
Abrogation of Parental Immunity, 18 B.C. ENVT. AFF. L. REv. 381, 401 n.157 (1991).
64. See, e.g., Smith, 183 S.E.2d at 195.
65. Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 419-21 (D.C. 1987); Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 856
("Formulation of different rules for the insured and uninsured, however, is not justified.").
66. Marcolin, supra note 57, at 786.
67. FED. R. EVID. 411.
1993]
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Only a few states wholly retain the immunity today, 8 while others have
partially limited its application. 9 The remaining states have either complete-
ly abrogated the doctrine or never originally adopted it."
2. Missouri
Soon after Missouri adopted the parental immunity doctrine, several
exceptions and limitations were placed on its application." In Wurth v.
Wurth,7" the court declined to extend the immunity to an emancipated minor
who was personally liable for expenses connected with her injuries.73 In
Brennecke v. Kilpatrick,74 the court refused to grant immunity to the estate
of a deceased parent on the rationale that the state's interest in preserving
family harmony did not extend past the lives of the parents.7" The court
announced that because parental immunity was a policy-based exception to the
68. Mathis v. Ammons, 453 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); American Fire & Casualty
Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d 186 (Ala. 1973) (Alabama parents immune
from liability for injuries caused by parents' negligence); Thomas v. Inmon, 594 S.W.2d 853
(Ark. 1980) (Arkansas parents and those standing in loco parentis are immune in negligence
actions); Coleman v. Coleman, 278 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (parents are immune from
liability for negligent acts); Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560 (Idaho 1980) (immunity exists for
negligent supervision or failure to supervise; however, no position is taken in other factual
settings); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 316 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (parents immune from
liability in negligence actions); Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1980)
(immunity exists between child and parents if parents are married or between child and custodial
parent if parents are divorced); Raybum v. Moore, 241 So. 2d 675 (Miss. 1970) (parents are
immune from liability for parental negligence); Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16 (Neb. 1959)
(parents immune from liability caused by parents' negligence); Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 427 P.2d
655 (N.M. 1967) (parents immune from liability for parental negligence); Campbell v.
Gruttemeyer, 432 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn. 1968) (parent immune from liability to unemancipated
child for injuries caused by parental negligence); Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971)
(parents immune from liability for parental negligence); Ball v. Ball, 269 P.2d 302 (Wyo. 1954)
(parents immune from liability).
69. Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385, 1390 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (parents
immune unless willful or wanton misconduct or act arises out of parents' pursuit of business or
employment activities); Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (parental
immunity abolished and Restatement position adopted); Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338
(N.Y. 1974) (no parental immunity, but parents have no legal duty to supervise children).
70. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967) (Alaska parents not immune for injuries in
negligence causes of action); Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966) (no parental immunity);
Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967) (no parental immunity for negligence); Kirchner
v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984) (parental immunity abolished); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d
351 (Pa. 1971) (abrogated parental immunity for personal tort actions); Elam v. Elam, 268
S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980) (no parental immunity).
71. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 854.
72. 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959) (en bane).
73. Id. at 746.
74. 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960) (en bane).
75. Id. at 69-73.
8
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general rule of liability, it should not be applied in cases when the justification
for the exception was nonexistent.76 Thus, the general rule in Missouri was
that parental immunity would not apply if the child was emancipated or if the
maintenance of the suit would not seriously disturb family relations."
In Fugate v. Fugate,78 the court refused to extend immunity to a post-
dissolution, noncustodial parent after an evidentiary hearing revealed that there
would not be a disruption in the family relationship because of the action.79
The court emphasized that it was balancing the child's right to recover for
personal injuries against both the parent's right to control and discipline a
child and the parent's duty to support and properly care for a child.8"
Finally, Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.8 held that parental immunity
barred contribution from a father when an evidentiary hearing determined that
there would be a disruption in family tranquility if the claims against the
father were allowed.82 The court also held that the application of parental
immunity should be determined on a case by case basis through an evidentiary
hearing to determine the applicability of one of the exceptions. 3 This limited
application of parental immunity was abolished by the Hartman case in which
the Missouri Supreme Court wholly abrogated parental immunity and adopted
the reasonable parent standard in children's actions for negligence against their
parents."
Two months after the Hartman decision, a bill was introduced in the
Missouri Legislature which would bar unemancipated children under eighteen
years of age from bringing negligence causes of action against their custodial
parents. 5 As the force behind the bill, its sponsor articulated several of the
popular criticisms of abolishing parental immunity, including intrusion of the
courts into family decision-making, the potential for numerous suits, and the
inability of the judicial system to set child-rearing standards.86 However,
76. Id. at 73.
77. Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Mo. 1979) (en bane).
78. 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
79. Id. at 667.
80. Id. at 669.
81. 634 S.W.2d 176 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
82. Id. at 179.
83. Id. at 180. The two exceptions were when the plaintiff was an emancipated minor and
when maintenance of the suit would not seriously disturb familial relationships. Id. at 179.
84. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 858.
85. Mo. H.R. 1809, 86th Legislative Assembly, 2d Regular Sess. (1992).
86. State Representative David C. Hale stated that the Hartman decision "expose[s] the
parents of this state to the process of having every child-rearing decision and exercise of parental
authority second-guessed by the courts." Fred W. Lindecke, B!. WouldBar Childrenfrom Suing
Parents, ST. L. POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 29, 1992, at A4. He also expressed his concerns that "[iun
today's suit-happy climate, this kind of judicial standard will rapidly evolve into [providing] a
cause of action for 'bad parenting."' Id. Moreover he felt that "[p]arents will be exposed to
suits for being too strict or not strict enough. Hired-gun psychologists and lawyers will take over
the process of defining child-rearing standards in Missouri." Id.
1993]
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Hartman still stands as the law in Missouri because the bill failed to pass the
legislature before the end of the 86th Legislative Session."
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Hartman v. Hartman, the Missouri Supreme Court began its analysis
by examining the common law development of the doctrine of parental
immunity, recognizing that the doctrine was judicially created based upon the
policy of preservation of family harmony.8 Th6 court noted that although
numerous justifications for parental immunity exist, the rationales espoused by
Missouri and the majority of jurisdictions were the public policy interests in
the maintenance of family harmony and avoidance of subverting parental
control or discipline.8 9  The court set out the development of parental
immunity in Missouri, characterizing the Wurth,90 Brenneke,9' Fugate,92
and Kendall93 decisions as a "piecemeal abrogation of the immunity."9
The court then balanced the public policy interest in maintaining family
harmony against the interest of an injured child to recover for injuries, and
found that the child's interest in recovery was greater.9" The court reasoned
that once a wrong has been committed, the harm to a family relationship has
already occurred and cannot be restored by prohibiting suit.96 Less weight
was afforded to the policy of preserving family harmony because the abolition
of spousal immunity in Missouri has not resulted in disruption of families. 97
The court commended the judicial system's ability to adjust the duty of care
between married persons and stated that the courts should be given the same
deference in parent-child disputes.98
Because the application of parental immunity was limited in tort cases
and was wholly inapplicable in property and contract cases, the court reasoned
that the public policy interest in maintaining family harmony was not actually,
substantially furthered.' Finally, the court stated that it was better to
abrogate parental immunity in its entirety than to develop even more
exceptions to an eroded rule."°
87. The bill was introduced on February 26, 1992, then was sent to the House Committee
on Judiciary February 27, 1992, where it remained until May 15, 1992, the end of the session.
88. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 854-55.
89. Id. at 854.
90. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 854.
95. Id. at 854-55.
96. Id. (citing Peterson v. City & County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ha. 1969)).
97. Id. at 855, 858.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 855 (citing Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 666 n.3 (Mo. 1979) (en bane)).
100. Id. at 855-56.
[Vol. 58
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Once the doctrine had been abrogated, the court tackled the problem of
maintaining parental discretion in the exercise of care, control, and discipline
while not allowing parents to exercise their parental prerogatives completely
without concern for liability.' In deciding which rule to adopt in Missouri,
the court reviewed the approaches of other jurisdictions that had abolished
parental immunity.'0 2
The first approach the court considered was to abolish the immunity to
the extent of the parents' insurance. 3 However, the court rejected this
approach because it would only serve to contribute to the piecemeal approach
to parental immunity by constituting yet another exception to the rule.)"
Moreover, differential treatment accorded insured versus uninsured parents
would not be justified and would be inconsistent with Missouri law.. 5
The second alternative the court considered was to adopt the Goller
standard and abrogate the immunity except when the injury involves an
exercise of parental authority or when the negligent act involves exercise of
ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, and other care. 6 The court rejected
this standard because of the difficulties in applying the standard, its arbitrari-
ness, and the inconsistent verdicts that have resulted in other jurisdictions.' 7
The aspect of the doctrine which the court found most troubling was that it
gives parents a "'carte blanche' to act negligently with respectto their children
so long as the parents' conduct falls within one of the exceptions."'O'
The final option the court considered was the Gibson reasonable parent
standard. 9 The court explained that this standard was most satisfactory
because it allows parents deference if exercised within a reasonable de-
gree."' The court found that the reasonable parent standard is sufficiently
flexible to allow for disparate child rearing practices while permitting a child
or third party plaintiff recovery if parents fail to meet the standard."' The
court also commented that a single standard of care, applicable in all cases,
avoids the arbitrary line-drawing of the Goller standard."'
The court also found support for the reasonable parent standard in the
position set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:" parental status is
not enough to give rise to immunity, and the reasonable, prudent parent
standard is appropriate for suits involving negligent exercises of parental





106. Id. (citing Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963)).
107. Id. at 856-57.
108. Id. at 857.
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discretion."4 The court then addressed the criticism that the degree of
care required from parents is not judicially determinable." 5 The court found
that the judicial system has already demonstrated its capacity to adjust the
standard of care in intra-family suits in the context of actions between
spouses." 6 Because statutes regulating juvenile proceedings require parents
to exercise reasonable parental discipline and authority,"' the court felt that
the Missouri Legislature endorsed the reasonable parent standard."' All of
the justices concurred in the decision to abolish parental immunity and adopt
a reasonable parent standard of care." 9
V. COMMENT
A. The Case for Abrogating the Immunity
The general rule is that persons should be held liable for the consequenc-
es of their acts; therefore, any exceptions to the rule should be adequately
justified.'20 Courts, commentators, and politicians have struggled for
decades to provide an adequate justification in support of parental tort
immunity.' 2' However, the justifications have failed to stand up to judicial
and scholarly scrutiny."
Fears that removal of the immunity will create an incentive for trivial
interferences with every Rparenting decision are not realistic and will not
materialize in Missouri.' The number of suits between parents and
children will certainly increase once the bar is removed; however, this increase
probably will not be dramatic. When the Missouri Supreme Court removed
intra-spousal immunity, the number of suits between spouses remained quite
small. ' In fact, only six cases have reached any Missouri appellate court
since the removal of the immunity six years ago. ' 1
114. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 857 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(G) &
cmt. k (1977)).
115. Id. at 858.
116. Id.
117. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.185.1-.185.2 (Supp. 1990).
118. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 858.
119. Id. at 858-59.
120. Hollister, supra note 2, at 525.
121. Id. at 508.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 525-27.
124. The Missouri Supreme Court abolished spousal immunity in both intentional tort and
negligence actions. Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(intentional torts); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986) (en bane) (negligence
actions).
125. See American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1990) (en bane);
Purk v. Purk, 817 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Hussman v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 768 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proctor, 758 S.W.2d 67
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Hoekstra v. Jenkins, 730 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Hester
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Damage or injury is required before a child plaintiff can make a prima
facie negligence case.'26 Therefore, only parenting decisions and acts which
result in actual harm to the child will be actionable. Moreover, the often
substantial expenses of litigation also create a barrier for children who would
bring trivial or frivolous negligence claims against their parents.
B. Third Parties
Another, and possibly the most compelling, rationale for abrogating the
immunity is that the immunity bars negligent third parties who injure the child
from reducing their proportional liability by the child's parent's negli-
gence. 7 Third parties are barred from seeking contribution against a parent
because parental immunity protects the parent from a direct action by the
child.' The rationale is that a third party should not be able to do
indirectly what the child cannot do directly."9 This issue arises when a
parent's negligence combines with the negligence of a third party to injure the
child. 30 The child then sues the third party who then impleads or seeks
contribution from the parent.'
Negligent third parties were present in both the Armstrong and Hartman
cases, which were consolidated in Hartman v. Hartman.' In Armstrong,
the mother's alleged negligence combined with the van operator's negligence,
and in Hartman it was the alleged negligence of the father and of the
grandfather in the operation of the gas stove that caused the injuries."3 The
bar to contribution is most inequitable when the third party is only slightly
negligent as compared to the parent because the third party is forced to
shoulder the entire burden of liability, although he or she is only responsible
for a fraction of it.'34 When parental immunity shelters a negligent parent
from liability, the result is always inequitable to third parties who are held
responsible for more damage than they actually caused.'
v. Rymer, 717 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
126. Downey v. Mitchell, 835 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
127. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1178-79.
128. Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
129. Id. at 179-80.
130. See Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1178.
131. Id.
132. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 852-53.
133. Id.
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,C. The Reasonable Parent Standard
Adoption of the reasonable parent standard is the best solution to the
problem of parent-child actions. First, the reasonableness standard of care has
been tried and tested, and the judicial system is familiar with the nuances of
its application.'36 The court's ability to adjudicate intra-family suits is
demonstrated by its ability to adjust the duty of care in actions between
spouses.'37 The success of the reasonable parent standard is also demonstrat-
ed by other jurisdictions' ability to apply the standard and reach equitable
results. 3'
Second, the reasonable parent standard allows equitable results to be
reached in cases involving negligent third parties.'39 When a parent's
negligence combines with a third party's, the third party will now only
shoulder the proportion of damages he or she actually caused. 4 ' Third
parties will no longer bear the burden of harm caused by negligent par-
ents.'
4 1
The reasonable parent standard is also more equitable because the
standard will be uniformly applied to all parents, whereas the former Missouri
approach only benefitted some parents."' Non-custodial parents and parents
in "non-harmonious" families were treated as any other third person, while
other parents were completely immune.
143
Finally, the reasonable parent standard may be less intrusive into family
autonomy. The old approach hinged on a pre-trial judicial determination of
the status of "family harmony" in each case."4  This highly subjective
inquiry may have been more personal and intrusive than a trial on the merits
of the underlying negligence action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Missouri's abolition of parental immunity in Hartman v. Hartman, and
adoption of the reasonable parent standard of care, strikes a suitable balance
between the interests of injured children and third parties and the parent's
136. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Marcolin, supra note 57, at 788-
89; Andrews, supra note 3, at 126-27.
137. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d at 857.
138. Hollister,supra note 2, at 525 & n.223.
139. See Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1178-79 nn.126-30.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo. 1982) (en bane);
Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Mo. 1979) (en bane).
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interest in having an adequate degree of discretion and family autonomy. The
reasonable parent standard will provide a proven, uniform standard, with
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